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CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

ELECTRONIC RIGHTS: AFTER TASINIWHO
OWNS WHAT, WHEN?
TASINI v. NEW YORK TIMES'
INTRODUCTION

It is an elementary principle of copyright law that one has only
the rights to use a work that he or she acquires from the copyright
holder or that are provided by the provisions of the Copyright Act.'
Once a work is written, the original creator is authorized to control
its use and re-use. The original creator may agree to submit the
work for publication as a part of a collective work with worldwide
distribution, exchanging rights for payment.' When the work is
fully exploited in one medium (e.g., print publications), the work
may be further profitable in an alternate medium, such as
electronic publications.4
In today's growing computer industry, with the advent of on-line
databases and CD-ROM products, electronic media proves to be
the latest vehicle for additional distribution.5 While consumers and
retailers have prospered from this move into in the computer
world, the legislature has lagged far behind technology's progress.6
It is essential that the Copyright Act of 1976 be tested to determine
1. Tasini v. New York Times, 1997 WL 466520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1997).
2. David J. Loundy, ElectronicDatabaseProviders Collect Court Decisions,
143 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. No. 198, October 9, 1997.
3. NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, § 2.03[A] (1997).
4. Jonathan Tasini, Tasini v. New York Times (last modified August 14,
1997) <http://www.igc.ape.org/nwu/tvt/tvthome.htm>.

5. Id.
6. Tasini vs. The New York Times, What Does It Mean For Writers? (last
modified August 23, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtwrit.htm>.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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if it can accommodate the conflicts that arise in the modem world
of computers! The limitations of the Copyright Act of 19768
(hereinafter "the Copyright Act" or "the Act") were recently
articulated in Tasini v. New York Times. In Tasini, the court was
asked to determine what rights are granted by a freelance writer
who submits an article to be published in a collective work9 and
who may profit when that collective work is reproduced
electronically and introduced to the lucrative computer medium.
This note will examine the facts and relevant sections of the
Copyright Act necessary to address these concerns.
TASINI V.NEW YORK TIMES
I. Facts
In December of 1993, Plaintiffs, a group of freelance journalists,
filed a complaint against prominent print publishers and electronic
service providers.1° The journalists alleged that the electronic
reproduction of print publications that included their articles
constituted copyright infringement when such electronic copies
were created without the expressed permission from the authors of
the individual articles." The plaintiffs did not contest the right of
the defendants to publish the articles as a part of a collective work,
but alleged that the defendants exceeded their narrow privilege
under the Copyright Act." The defendants responded by invoking
the "revision" privilege of the "collective works" provision of the
Act. 13 The defendants maintained that as copyright owners of a
collective work, the Act affords them the ability to make revisions
to the work as a whole without disrupting the integrity of the
individual works. 14 It is this integrity that the plaintiffs claimed to
7. Id.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1997).
9. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *3.
10. Id. at *4.
11. Id. at*2.
12. Id. at *5.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 204(b).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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be not only disrupted, but also destroyed through the defendant's
practice of electronic republication."5
On August 13, 1997, in Tasini v. New York Times, the court had
its first opportunity to evaluate the role of copyright in electronic
publishing.' 6 The Act was closely scrutinized by the court in order
to determine if the traditional concepts of print and film copyright
law can be accurately translated to the relatively uncharted territory
of electronic copyright law.' 7 In Tasini, Judge Sonya Sotomayer
considered whether publishers were entitled to place the contents
of their periodicals on electronic databases and CD-ROMs without
first securing the permission of the freelance writers whose
contributions are included in those periodicals. 8 This analysis
required the court to evaluate § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, in
conjunction with the interpretation of § 204(a) and § 103(b), to
determine if, explicitly or implicitly, the transformation of hard
copy to electronic copy constitutes a "revision" as a publisher
privilege." For the electronic media industry, Judge Sotomayer's
ruling in favor of the publishers' summary judgment motion, "is a
plea that the section is unclear and Congress should fix it."2
II. The Parties
A. Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs are all members of the National Writer's Union
(NWU), with Jonathan Tasini, the lead plaintiff being the president
of the organization.2 NWU is an organization that represents
approximately 4,500 freelance journalists, book authors, poets,
15. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *5.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Meg Carter, The Copyright Casesfrom Washington to Shetland, THE
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), August 26, 1997, at N10.
18. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *2.
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Writers Win MajorPoints, Lose on Strange Interpretationof Copyright
Law (last modified August 14, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtstate.
htm>. by Via Sapientiae, 2016
Published
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technical writers and editorial cartoonists.2 2 Tasini articulated the
importance of their claims as follows:
For decades, when freelance writers sold stories
to American publications, it was understood by all
concerned that they were selling only First North
American Serial rights which allowed the
newspaper or magazine to publish the story in print
one time. For freelance authors, retention of all
other copyrights is crucial to their economic
survival because significant additional source of
income comes from their ability to sell secondary
rights such as syndication, translations and
anthologies.23
B. Defendants
Four of the defendant companies, The New York Times (the
"Times"), Sports Illustrated, Newsday, and The Atlanta Monthly
are major players in the publishing industry who, at the time of the
suit, employed varying writer-publisher contractual practices.24
Generally, the freelance writer entered into a contract, either orally,
partially written or entirely written. Despite their differences, all
the contracts commonly lacked the explicit grant of electronic
rights.2 The Atlanta Monthly settled with the plaintiffs before
trial. The remaining defendants argued that they solicited work
from the plaintiffs through legal and ordinary publication channels,
and thus they were granted the electronic right.26 Before this
litigation, the Times customarily hired freelance writers through
entirely verbal agreements.27 The editor and freelance writer would
meet to determine the length, topic, deadlines and payment for
22. Collective CopyrightLicensing to Benefit IndividualPhotographers,
Artists, and Writers (last modified May 3, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.
org/nwu/anc/nwu-asmp.htm>.
23. Jonathan Tasini, Tasini v. New York Times (last modified August 14,
1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/nwu/tvttvthome.htmt>.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at * 1.
Id.
Id. at *24 n. 1.
Id. at *2.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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each article.28 Neither party relied on a written contract to enforce
the duties or formal obligations. 29 Recently however, the Times
adopted a policy where the paper only accepts articles upon
express written surrender of all rights in the author's creation, now
called "All Rights" contracts.3"
The two additional defendants, Lexis-Nexis ("Nexis") and
University Microfilm Inc. ("UMI"), (collectively, "Electronic
Publishers"), operate online publication companies. Electronic
Publishers' role in the alleged copyright infringement is a result of
their actions directed from the print publishers in the exercise of
their right to reproduce the collective works electronically.31 Nexis
has carried the plaintiffs' articles since the early 1980's and serves
as a resource to search and view periodical works from a computer
terminal.32 Nexis received "mechanicals" which resembled full
pages as they would appear at publication of the writers'
contributions, but only used the text of the article, its author and
page location in the initial collective work.33 UMI has distributed
"The New York Times OnDisc" since 1992.3" It reproduces the
entire Times publication on CD-ROM and sells it to consumers.
The Times OnDisc references each individual article in its system
with a link to the issue, date and page of the print publication in
which the article originally appeared.35

28. Id. at *8.
29. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *8.
30. Id. at *24 n. 2. The New York Times has recently adopted a policy
pursuant to which the paper accepts articles by freelance writers only on the
express written condition that the authors surrender all rights in his or her

creation. Id.
31. Id. at *6.
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id. The defendant publishers deliver or electronically transmit to Nexis
the full text of all of the articles appearing in each daily or weekly edition of
their periodicals. The publishers provide Nexis with a complete copy of
computer text files that the publishers use during the process of producing the
hard copy versions of their periodicals. The "mechanicals" resemble full pages
as they will appear at publication. Nexis does not use the electronic files to
create the "mechanicals" or to emulate the physical layout of each issue, but
uses the electronic files to imput the contents if each article on-line along with
the author's name, the publication and page in which each article appeared. Id.
34. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *3.
35. Id. at *4.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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Ill Scope of the Publisher'sPrivilegeto Reproduce
The defendants contended that as publishers, they were afforded
copyright protection for their collective work as a whole.36 The
defendants claimed that the transfer of certain sticks within the
plaintiffs' bundle of rights was permissible and governed by
Copyright Law.37 The legal transfer of individual rights from
writer to publisher is classified as a privilege which bestows
certain rights to re-use original works at the publisher's
discretion.38 One such privilege is the ability for the publisher of a
collective work to make revisions. 9 It is the length to which a
publisher may go in creating revisions which is at dispute,
specifically whether electronic republications are permissible under
the privilege.
The writers allege that the transfer of North American Rights of
First publication, understood in their contracts with the defendants
and in the absence of the electronic rights language, did not permit
the publisher to profitably exploit the writer's work without his
subsequent permission.4" This problem can be attributed to the
traditional practices of the publishing industry where parties do not
negotiate the details of the contracts for freelance employment.4
Not only must the court determine what rights were transferred in
the oral contracts, but also the limitations of the exercise of those
rights.
Since the Times did not use written contracts at all, we turn to
Newsday's practices to examine the language of the contracts.42
Newsday's editors orally discussed the details of the writer's
engagement with the publisher and, upon agreement, a check was
36. Id.
37. Id. at *3.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). The subject matter of copyright as specified in the
Copyright Act includes compilations and derivative works. Furthermore, § 201
grants original authors the right to transfer the ownership rights of their
individual works or any subdivision of rights inherent in the copyright
ownership they posses. 17 U.S.C. § 201.

39. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
40. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *1.
41. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, ElectronicData Bases and Rights of
Freelancers,218 N.Y.L.J 49, at 2, (1997).
42. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *2.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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given to the writer in exchange for his contribution.43 The check's
endorsement appeared on the back of the check and included the
explicit grant of First Time publication rights to the publisher.
Upon receipt, Tasini crossed out the endorsement when cashing the
check, while the other writers cashed it with the endorsement
intact.4
Solicitations for employment by Sports Illustrated publishers
were more formal." Sports Illustrated's contracts included an
explicit grant of First Publication rights and the right to re-use the
article with additional compensation to the writer. However, these
contracts lacked the explicit language to grant the publishers the
right to reproduce the article electronically. 4 Whether such a grant
can be implied embodies the basic issue of the court's analysis.
The defendants argued that the Copyright Act implicitly
encompasses the electronic publication rights referred to in oral or
loosely written contracts between freelance writers and publishers.
Tasini, as the landmark case regarding publishing in the computer
age, has the opportunity to establish whether the author of an
article who submits his work to be included in a periodical, forfeits
the ability to be compensated when that periodical is subsequently
published electronically.47
1V Holding in Tasini.
As a case of first impression for the court, Judge Sotomayer
ruled on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment.
The court held in favor of the defendants, finding as a matter of
law, the electronic re-use of the plaintiffs articles constituted a
revision as allowed under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act. 48 It also
recognized that this interpretation of § 201(c) created a windfall to
the publishers and signifies that the current legislation may

43. Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Tasiniv. The New York Times and the FreeFlow of Information (last

modified January 11, 1997) <http://www.ige.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtlib'htm>.
48. Tasini,
1997 WL 466520,
Published
by Via Sapientiae,
2016 at *4.
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49
inadequately accommodate advancements in modem technology.
In denying the plaintiffs relief at this junction, the opinion brings
the issue to the hands of the legislature.5" Being such a timely
issue in today's world of communication and technology, Tasini's
final outcome has industry wide ramifications affecting writers,
publishers and electronic media companies.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT

The sections of the Copyright Act pertinent to Tasini and Judge
Sotomayer are § 204(a), § 101, § 201(c) and § 103(b)."1 Through
the discussion of these fundamental rights of copyright law, it is
possible to follow Judge Sotomayer's systematic analysis of the
plaintiffs' allegations and understand the court's holding in favor
of the defendants. It is crucial that these elements are understood
before discussing the importance of their interaction in the case.
I Section 201(c)
A. Rights Afforded to Authors of Copyrighted Collective Works.
Section 201(c) bestows certain rights to copyright owners of
collective works.
Copyright in each separate contribution to a
collective work is distinct from copyright in the
collective works as a whole, and vest initially in the
author of the contribution. In the absence of an
express transfer of the copyright or of any rights
under it, the owner of copyright in the collective
work is presumed to have acquired only the
privilege of reproducing and distributing the
contribution as part of that particular collective
49. Tasini vs The New York Times, What Does it Mean for Writers? (last
modified August 23, 1997) <http:/www.igc.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtwrit.htm>.
50. Id.
51. Tasini, 1997 WL 466529, at *9.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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work, and any later collective work in the same
articles.5 2

The complexity of the role of § 201(c) in the publishing industry
is best understood by examining the implications of its
components.53 The first sentence states that the author of the
individual contribution in a collective work retains all copyrights
as its creator.5 4 In its second sentence, § 201(c) extends to all
publishers of collective works the privilege of "reproducing and
distributing ...any revision of that collective work." It is the scope
of these privileges wherein the Tasini dispute lies." One who
assembles an independent work "into a collective whole" becomes
the author of the collective work and is consequently entitled to
copyright protection. The author of a collective work is privileged
to "reproduce and distribute each contribution as a part of that
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later
collective work in the same series." 6 Section 201(d)(2) of the
Copyright Act expressly provides for the divisibility of copyrights
and for copyright owners to transfer all or part of any exclusive
right granted under the Copyright Act. 7 Accordingly, the
transferee of the copyright, or a related exclusive right, will be
treated as the owner of the copyright, although the nature of the
transferee's rights in the work will depend upon the scope of the
transferor's grant of rights.58
In the absence of an express transfer of the
copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of
copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as a part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that
52. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
53. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *10.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 5.02.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) ("Any exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
including any subdivision of any rights, may be transferred.. .and owned

separately.").
58. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 5.07[C].
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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collective work, any later collective work in the
same series.59
B. In Tasini
The plaintiffs allege that not only were the defendant publishers
directly liable for the infringement of their electronic rights, but
were also contributorily liable due to the electronic database
companies re-use of the articles bought from the print publishers.'
The plaintiffs also insisted that the grant of rights was limited to
the "North American Rights of first publication."'" Nevertheless,
the defendants maintained that the practice of electronically
reproducing the plaintiffs articles was authorized under § 201(c)
and they merely generated revisions of their rightfully owned
copyrighted collective work.62
I1 Section 204(a)
A. Elements of an Effective Transfer of OriginalCopyrights
Requiring a written transfer of individual copyright between
parties is often referred to as the copyright "statute of frauds" and
is strictly enforced by the courts.63 Under § 204 (a):
[A] transfer of copyright ownership (other than
one brought by operation of law) is valid only if
there exists an instrument of conveyance, or
alternatively a "note or memorandum of the
transfer" which is in writing and signed by the
copyright owner "or such owner's duly authorized
agent." 64

17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *10 n. 3.
Id. at*11.
Id. at *1.
63. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 106[B][2].
64. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *13.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
59.
60.
61.
62.
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In order for a transfer of copyright ownership to be valid, the
agreement between parties must comport with this section of the
Copyright Act.6" Through a broad reading of this writing
requirement, "a writing memorializing the assignment of copyright
interests does not have to be the Magna Carta; a one-line pro forma
statement will do.66 However, the terms of any writing purporting
to transfer copyright interests, even a one-line pro forma statement,
must be clear."67 A written contract is not necessary for the transfer
of rights from employee author to employer publisher as a result of
the work-for-hire doctrine, constitutes as automatic transfer by
operation of law.68 This distinction between work-for-hire and
freelance engagements need not be discussed, however, since
neither party claimed the work in question was for hire.
B. In Tasini
Newsday argued that an express transfer of electronic rights
occurred when the plaintiffs signed the endorsements and cashed
the checks.69 The court applied § 204(a) and its plain meaning to
agree that the writers and publishers had an understanding; the
writers relied on the oral agreements, submitting their works in
exchange for future payment.7" The endorsement reads as follows:
Signature required.
Check void if this
endorsement altered. This check accepted as full
payment for the first-time publication rights (or all
right, if this agreement is for all rights) to material
described on the face of check in all editions
published by Newsday and for the right to include
such material in electronic library archives. 7 '
65. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
66. Papa's June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-1159
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557

(9th Cir. 1990)).
67. Id.
68. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 10.03 [A].
69. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
Published
by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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Newsday claimed that the plaintiffs' action in endorsing and
depositing the payment evidenced their understanding and
agreement to transfer the electronic rights.72 Judge Sotomayer's
response: "[T]hat is not enough."'73 The court explained that check
legends alone are ambiguous and cannot be taken to reflect a
express transfer of electronic rights in the plaintiffs articles.74
Although the court agreed with Newsday that a written agreement
might be executed to confirm a prior oral agreement, it rejected
Newsday's attempt to take advantage of the law's flexibility by
using the check endorsement to expressly grant rights beyond the
original parties' understanding.75 Even if the endorsement was
enforceable, the endorsement only claimed the right to use the
plaintiffs' articles in Newsday's in-house electronic library
archives.76
Behold the plaintiffs' most persuasive argument. Their assertion
that "electronic library archives" do not encompass the use for the
electronic databases outside the initial publishing company (e.g.,
Nexis or CD-ROMs) was accepted by Judge Sotomayer.77 The
court held the defendants' right to re-use the articles for in-house
archives could be reasonably interpreted from the endorsement, but
could not serve as an umbrella protection for the defendant to sell
the articles to commercial databases.78 The electronic
"repackaging" of the plaintiffs' articles was for wholly different
purposes than the creators had anticipated. Both parties conceded
that the library archives mentioned in the endorsement referred to
Newsday's in-house archival system, which bore no commercial
advantages. Thus, the court used §204 to determine that Newsday
endorsements could not be interpreted, as a matter of law, to
represent the unequivocal and timely transfer of electronic rights of
the plaintiffs' articles.79

72. Id.
73. Id. at *15.
74. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d. Cir.
1996).
75. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *6.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *15.
78. Id. at *7.
79. Id. at *16.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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III. Section 103(b)
A. The Distinction Between a Collective work as a type of
Compilation and a Derivative Work
Section 103(b) provides:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to that material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does
not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.
The copyright in such work is
independent of, and does affect or enlarge the scope,
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the preexisting material."0
Section 103(b) protects collective and derivative works under the
Copyright Act." These two separate types of copyrightable works
are commonly based on preexisting works."
"Both collective
works and derivative works are based upon preexisting works that
are in themselves capable of copyright." 3 Where a derivative
work "transforms" a preexisting work into a new creation, a
collective work consists of numerous original contributions, which
are not altered, but are assembled to create an original collective
whole. 4 The collective work is copyrightable as a new work due to
the creativity in the work's arrangement." However, the copyright
of a collective work does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership, or subsistence of any copyright protection in the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
Id.
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 3.02.
Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *8.
17 U.S.C. § 101. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,

Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that to qualify for a separate copyright as a
"derivative work," the additional matter injected into a prior work must
constitute more than a minimal or trivial contribution).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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preexisting material.86 Specifically, copyright in a "new version"
covers the material added by the later author and has no effect on
the copyright or public domain status of the preexisting material.87
B. Tasini
Following the Supreme Court's lead, Judge Sotomayer
illustrated the contemporary stand on "new property rights" created
in collective and derivative works. 8 In Stewart v. Abend, the
author of a fictional story agreed to assign the rights in his renewal
copyright term to the owner of a movie version of that story, but
died before the commencement of the renewal period.89 The
assignment never occurred, and it was held that the defendant
infringed the copyright of the successor owner of the story by
continuing to distribute the film during the renewal term of the
preexisting work.90 The Supreme Court said that an assignment of
renewal rights to a copyrighted fictional story for the distribution
of a movie version is not an assignment of the original owner's
rights to a derivative or collective work.9" Therefore, subsequent
distribution of the film during the renewal period, absent the
original owner's permission of the copyright, constituted
infringement and did not preclude the owners from enforcing his
rights.92 Furthermore, "so long as the preexisting work remains out
of the public domain, its use is infringing if one who employs the
work does not have a valid license or assignment for use of the
preexisting work. It is irrelevant whether the preexisting work is
inseparably intertwined with the derivative work."93 Under
§103(b), any unauthorized use of the preexisting protected material
by the creator of a derivative or collective work, infringes the
copyright existing in the preexisting material.94 In Tasini,the court
held that the electronic reproductions of the print-publications
86. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
87. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *9.
88. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
89. Id.
90. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *10.
91. Abend, 495 U.S. at 219.
92. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *22.
93. Abend, 495 U.S. at 223-24.
94. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *23.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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qualified as "revisions" under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act.
Therefore, the print-publishers could employ Nexis and UMI to
create the electronic reproductions and were not limited to
reproductions in print media.95
IV The Court's Analysis
Examined together, the Tasini court recognizes that, at first
glance, § 201(c) and § 103(b) complement and enforce the
Copyright Act's interest in protecting original creator's rights
while encouraging the creation of new works.9 6 However, with a
closer reading of § 201(c), in part with (a) and (b), the rights to
creators of collective works are enumerated as the "privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as a part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that collective work and
any later work in the same series."9 7 It is here, in the scope of
copyright protection afforded to copyright owners of collective
works, which is at issue in Tasini.
A. the Publisher'sRight to Reproduce
In light of Judge Sotomayer's interpretation of the Copyright Act
and in consideration of the court's policies of copyright law, the
plaintiffs' argument failed.98 The freelance writers contended that
the right to make revisions of the collective works owned by the
publishers was acceptable under the Copyright Act. The re-use
and elicit reproductions by the defendants exceeded the boundaries
interpreted and explained in § 201(c).99 They argued the changes to
the original works, in order to carry out the purpose of the
collective work's inclusion on CD-ROMs and online databases,
destroyed the distinctive characteristic of the collective work.1"
The plaintiffs claimed that the nature in which the electronic
95. Raysman & Brown, supra note 41, at 6.
96. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *10.

97. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
98. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *18.

99. Id. at* 19.
100. byId.Viaat*Sapientiae,
18.
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databases were created and offered to the public violated the
principles of the fundamental copyright protection." The searches
made available by the electronic defendants were designed with a
coding system to retrieve individual articles out of context from the
collective work in which it was originally published." 2 For the
convenience of the database users, articles were editorially
supplemented to withstand this "out of context" appearance and
displayed with headers which identified the author of the article,
the publication and the page in which the article first appeared.0 3
The plaintiffs read the privileges of § 201(c) narrowly to cover
nonexclusive licenses, which unlike assignments and exclusive
licenses, are non-transferable."
Relying on § 201(d),1°5 the
plaintiffs claimed that the electronic revisions of the defendants'
collective works constituted actionable infringement because the
defendant publishers could only exercise the privileges of those
rights validly transferred to them by the freelance writers.106 In the
absence of an explicit grant of rights, the plaintiffs argued that the
defendants incorrectly assumed that the rights were transferred
under the vague oral contracts and were not limited to the first time
use in print publications."'
Judge Sotomayer found no support in the Copyright Act for the
plaintiffs' contention that the "privilege" of § 201 should be read
so narrowly." 8 Instead, the court cited Congress' intention in
drafting the Copyright Act to find that the Act simply would not
have advanced its goal if publishers were constrained in their
efforts to generate and distribute legal revisions and reproductions.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at *19.
Id. at *21.
Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *21.
Id. at*11.
The provision states, in part, the following:
1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part
by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by
will as personal property by application of laws of intestate succession.
2) Any of the exclusive rights composed in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any rights specified in section 106, may be transferred as
provided by clause (1) to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the
copyright owner by title. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *10.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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A narrow reading of the Act would not prevent the exploitation of
individual contributions, but would only serve to undermine the
competing goal of ensuring that collective works be marketed and
distributed to the public."1"9
B. Interpretationof what constitutes a Revision.
The plaintiffs also argued that the New York Times OnDisc
could not "reasonably be considered revisions of the publisher
defendants' periodicals because the significant elements periodical
as a whole were not preserved electronically.""'
The OnDisc
articles appeared without the photographs and in different page
layouts than when originally published. The plaintiffs claimed that
the CD-ROM reproductions plainly failed to reproduce the original
arrangement of materials as they were first published.'
Judge
Sotomayer disagreed and said that by re-using the selection of
plaintiffs' articles, "the defendants have managed to retain one of
the few defining original elements of the publisher's collective
works."'' 2 Since publishers of collective works only own the
arrangement of the entire work and the Copyright Act establishes
that publishers can make revisions, the alteration or absence of the
13
original "set up" is the only way a revision could be made.'
Therefore, if the electronic defendants carried recognizable
versions of the periodicals in which the plaintiff writers originally
agreed, the revision was not an infringement."' Nexis and UMI
carried recognizable revisions, and for the purposes of § 201(c)
"the defendants have succeeded at creating any revision of those
collective works.""' 5
In other words, where a compilation
possessed both original arrangement and original selection to
obtain copyright under law, a substantial similarity persists even
' 6
when original arrangement was sacrificed." 1
109. Id. at *12.
110. Id. at *21.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *22.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the electronic
reproductions did not qualify as revisions, the court was persuaded
by the defendants' assertion that they were authorized to make any
such revision."1 7 When traditional copyright provisions were
applied to the electronic medium, inadequacies of the current
Copyright Act became apparent. The Copyright Act was ratified in
1976 and operates in the context of microfilm and microfiche as
the medium of re-use. Such an industry lacks the lucrative
characteristic of the modem electronic information age." 8 The
Tasini court recognized a limit to the defendants' use and re-use of
the plaintiffs' articles, but not to the extent suggested by the
119
plaintiffs.
First, the plaintiffs contended that the right to reproduce articles
as a part of collective work did not include the right to exploit
computer technologies, which, by their nature, require the display
of the work. l12 Next, the plaintiffs claimed that the absence of the
Copyright Act's explicit definition that a revision was allowed,
implied the right to revise was not permitted. Fatally, however, the
plaintiffs prematurely stopped their discussion of the right to
reproduce and did not explain how reproduction of their work
would be permitted.' The court was forced to pick up where
the plaintiffs left off. Judge Sotomayer reasoned, although
reproduction is not defined separately under the Copyright Act,
§106 reveals that reproductions inevitably resulted in "copies."' 22
The defendants capitalized on the opportunity
to describe "copies,"
23
looking to § 101 of the Copyright Act.1
'Copies' are material objects.. .in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived,

117. Id.
118. Jeff Garigliano, FirstRound in Electronic PublishingRights Case Goes
to Publishers,FOLIO: THE MAGAZINE FOR MAGAZINE MANAGEMENT, 1997 WL
2006228,*1.
119. Id.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
121. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *12.
122. Id. at* 13.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device...' 24

The court found the right to reproduce a work necessarily
encompassed the right to create copies of the work and
presupposed such copies might be perceived from a computer
terminal." 5 The plaintiffs urged the court to consider the fact that
the earlier versions of the Copyright Act granted publishers the
right to publish the works, including distribution, public
performance and public display." 6 The plaintiffs concluded that
the absence of this grant in the final version of the Act served to
deny the publishers this right. 7 The court was unwilling to
interpret the absence of such language in the final version of the
Copyright Act as an intentional omission that should be given
greater weight than afforded in the final Act."2
Thus, in
accordance with the Copyright Act, the court determined that as
long as the defendants operated within the scope of their privilege
to reproduce and distribute the plaintiffs articles, incidental
display of those individual contributions did not violate any
explicit section of the Act.2 9
C. The Right to Reproduce a Collective Work.
Judge Sotomayer's holding comports with the Supreme Court's
concern that the "creators of factual compilation and collective
works derive their rights solely from their original contributions,
and [should] not be permitted to usurp complete control over the

124. Id.
125. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *13.
126. Id. at *12. Plaintiffs refer to Section 106 of the Act, which
lists the five exclusive rights, (the "bundle" of rights), constituting a
copyright. The "reproduction" privilege identified under Section
201(c), as plaintiffs note, invokes the right "to reproduce the
copyrighted works in copies or phonorecords." Section 201(c) does
not, however, implicate the distinct right to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
127. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *13.
128. Id.
129. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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component parts of their creation.""13 The judge found that the
defendants protected the original selection of articles when they
electronically reproduced and adequately maintained the integrity
of the collective work, resulting in the acceptable revision of the
original publication.'31 Articles that are included on the Nexis
database include the minimal "certain percentage" of the articles
Under this "percentage" standard
selected by the defendant.'
employed by the court, the Electronic Publishers' reproduction of
the Times publication was an acceptable revision on Nexis because
they were authorized to do so by the print publishers.'33 The court
found that this immersion into a larger database did not
The
automatically destroy the original published work."' 34
defendants avoided this risk by displaying the articles
electronically and maintaining the connection to the newspaper or
periodical in which it first appeared.'35 The court found that this
link back to the original publication enhanced the value of the
article individually, because an article's association with certain
periodicals potentially enhances the value of that article.'36
"Indeed, an article appearing in Newsday or the Times is instantly
imbued with a certain degree of credibility that might not exist in
the case of an article never published or an article published in
other periodicals."' 37
Furthermore, the court found that the traits lost during the
transfer of the plaintiffs' articles from hard copy to the electronic
reproductions were of only peripheral concern.' 38 The purpose of
§201(c) is "to avoid the exploitation of individual articles, and not
to prevent publishers from reworking their collective work in
significant ways. Congress determined that publishers should have
the leeway to preserve certain original aspects of their creation
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b); NIMMER, supra note 3, at 3-20-21 (stating only
that which is original with the copyright proprietor or his assignor may be
protected by his copyright).
131. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *22.
132. Id. at *20.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at * 24 n. 14.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *21.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4

20

Pascarelli: Electronic Rights: After Tasini Who Owns What, When? Tasini v. Ne

1997]

TASINI v. NY TIMES

while discarding others."'139 It is up to the courts to support the
law, thus being responsible for protecting this leeway until such
law is changed. Accepting that Congress constructed §201(c) to
empower publishers to create "any revision" of their collective
works, the court is then only called upon to determine whether the
electronic reproductions are different from the defendants'
collective works.14°
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' right to reproduce
the collective work was confined by a narrow scope that was
limited to the examples of revisions included in the Copyright
Act."'
Namely, the defendants' reproduction via electronic
databases and CD-ROM encyclopedias was outside the intention of
Congress. They provided a passage of the House Report on the
matter. 42 The section of the House Report referred to by the
plaintiffs is as follows:
Under the language of this clause a publishing
company could reprint a contribution from one issue
in a later issue of its magazine, and could reprint an
article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a
1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise
the contribution itself or include it in a new
anthology or an entirely different magazine or other
1 43
collective work.
The court regarded the encyclopedia example as so outside the
realm of today's technology that it was nearly obsolete.1" Under
the language of §201(c) and its legislative history, the court could
not reasonably interpret the Copyright Act as being overly media
restrictive.1 45 Upon a closer examination of the language of this
section, it contained no express limitation upon the medium in
which a revision can be created.1 46 "To the contrary, 'any revision'
139. Id. at *22.
140. Id.
141. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520 at *14.
142. Id.
143. H.R . REP. No. 1476, 94' Cong., at 122-23 (1976).
144. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *14.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
146. Id.
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of a collective work is permissible, provided it is a revision of 'that
collective work."' 147 The plaintiffs claimed that Congress was
unaware of computer technologies that would change the way
publishers reproduced their collective works and intentionally
omitted such a provision in § 201(c). Judge Sotomayer found it
was more accurate to say Congress was aware of such
technologies, "but did not fully understand the implications of the
computer technologies." 148
Upon ratification of the Copyright Act, Congress recognized its
inability to resolve the complicated issues concerning the
technological advancements of the computer era.' 49 Congress felt
the cause would be better served after an organized study was
conducted. 5 ' The National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") carried out the task in
1980.'
Upon CONTU's review, Congress repealed the original
§117 of the Copyright Act which addressed the "implications of
automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or
transferring information" because it was unnecessary to limit the
medium in which a revision can be created under § 201(c)." 2 The
court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that Congress
removed § 117 because such a transformation would not constitute
a revision, but would create an entirely new work. Without an
expressed transfer of the right to create derivative works from the
original author, any such creation was an act of copyright
infringement.153
Alternatively, the court found Congress' initial consideration of
the need to include a separate section governing electronic
reproduction was a strong indication that the final enacted version,
absent the provision, encompassed future electronic and
developing technologies. 54 As a result, the court concluded "no
147. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *14.
148. Id. at *14 (citing Arthur R. Miller, CopyrightProtectionsFor Computer
Programs,Databases,And Computer Generated Works: Is Anything New Since
CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REv. 977, 979 (1993)).
149. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *14.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
153. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *15.
154. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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remaining reason to foreclose the possibility of an electronic
'revision' of a collective work." '
Following the defendants'
arguments, the court determined the Copyright Act was crafted
with the goal of media neutrality and in a technologically forward
looking manner."' 6 Furthermore, the definitions of the terms in
§101, are constructed broadly to accommodate and adapt to the
new advancing media." 7 In sum, the defendants' assertion that
Congress did not intend for the interpretation of the terms
"reproduction" and "revision" to be radically different from the
media neutral characteristic prevalent throughout the Copyright
Act was sound."'
D. ElectronicPublicationof a Collective Work is an Acceptable
Revision.
Plaintiffs complained that defendants not only failed to preserve
their collective works, but they also actively dismantled those
works." 9 Upon further examination of each use by the Electronic
Publishers, there was a distinction that the court found
controlling."6 This distinction articulated another important step in
understanding the reasoning of the court's final holding.
Employing an approach typically used in the evaluation of
infringement claims pertaining to factual compilations, Judge
Sotomayer implemented a two step process.'
This approach
began with the identification of an original trait in the individual
work, requiring a sufficient preservation of that trait in the
subsequent revision.'62 Infringement commonly occurs when that
original trait is copied in a "revision" of that compilation.
Alternatively, in the context of collective works, the preservation

155. Id.
156. Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835
Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1965).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
158. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *15.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *18.
161. Id.
162. by
Id.Via
at *19.
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of the original trait does not reach the same conclusion. 6 "If the
disputed periodicals manifested an original selection or
arrangement of materials, and if that originality was preserved
electronically, then the electronic reproductions can be deemed a
permissible revisions of the defendant's collective works."'" The
court determined the exploitation of the author's work without
preserving the sense of being a part of an entire work results in the
infringement and is an unacceptable re-use as a revision.16
Before addressing the specific facts of Tasini, Judge Sotomayer
explained the Court's understanding of the term "revision" in the
context of collective works. 66 The plaintiffs insisted that, by its
plain meaning, a "revision" must be nearly identical to the
original. 67 The court disagreed, finding nowhere in the Copyright
Act support for this assumption.'68 The rule derived from the
language of the Act convinced the court that a revision could alter
a preexisting work through editorial revisions by a sufficient
degree to give rise to a new original creation.69 The limitations
embodied in the language of § 201(c) permitted the publishers to
"reproduce an individual contribution "as a part of... any revision"
of the collective work in which it initially appeared. 7 Contrary to
the Plaintiffs' assertion of what constitutes an authorized
reproduction under § 201(c), the court held that the reproduction of
a collective work supported Congress' intent to prevent publishers
from altering or reshaping the content of individual articles. 7 '
"With this limitation in place, Congress apparently was willing to
permit publishers significant leeway." 7
It seems that Judge
Sotomayer did not realize the weight of this comment in light of
the case holding, because it is this leeway that has the greatest
impact on the outcome of the case. It was the goal of the plaintiffs

163. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *19.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *20.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *16.
168. Tasini, 1997 WL466520, at *16.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
171. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *16.
172. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/4
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through this suit to curtail, control and possibly even eliminate this
'
privilege. 73
The publishers, as copyright owners of collective works,
prevailed in the court's interpretation of the Copyright Act.174 The
Act articulates that a compromise was previously reached between
authors and publishers. The two parties were comfortable
permitting broad discretion in revising their collective works,
provided those individual articles would remain in tact.17 More
importantly, the "key limitation imposed on publishers under
§201(c) rests in the fact that publishers are only permitted to
reproduce a particular article as a part of a revised version of the
'
collective work in which that article originally appeared."176
The
elements of an acceptable revision of a collective work under
§201(c) provides that a new work must be recognizable as a
version of a preexisting collective work to be fairly characterized
as a revision of that "collective work."17' 7 The Court clarified how
a work, comprised of individually copyrighted works can be
revised without alteration of the separate component works.17 The
Court stated that collective works are found to "possess
distinguishing original characteristics of their own, i.e., they are
greater than the sum of their parts. 179
The Copyright Act defines collective works as a type of
compilation, a work composed of preexisting materials that are
selected, coordinated or arranged in a manner which represents an
original work of authorship. 8 However, not all collective works
are compilations. Some compilations consist of pure factual
information that, regardless of how it is arranged or presented,
cannot be copyrighted.8 It is a "bedrock principle of copyright"
that no author may possess a copyright of facts.182 A compilation
is "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
173. Id. at *17.
174. 17 US.C. § 101.

175. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *16.
176. Id.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
178. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *16.
179. Id. at *17.
180. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
181. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *17.
182. Id.
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materials or data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such
a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original
work of authorship.183 A telephone book is a common example of
a compilation.'84 It is composed of facts, published logically by
alphabetical order. 8 However, the "author" of a telephone book
does not impart an element of creativity, thought or ingenuity in
the arrangement of the information compiled, and therefore, cannot
claim to own the work under the Copyright Act.'86
A collective work includes "a work such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are
assembled into a collective whole."'87 Newspapers or magazines
are of a distinct type of collective work provided by the Copyright
Act. "The New York Times perhaps even represents the paradigm,
the epitome of a publication in which selection alone reflects
sufficient originality to merit copyright protection."' 88
Identifying 'all the news that's fit to print' is not
nearly as mechanical... a task as gathering all the
phone numbers from a particular region. Indeed
recognizing matters of interest to readers is a highly
subjective undertaking, one that different editors
and different periodicals undoubtedly perform with
varying degrees of success.' 89
The crucial distinction between compilations and collective
works lies in the fact that collective works are made of separate
and independent works protected as the original contributions of
individual authors. 9° In other words, the creators of collective
works are entitled to rights in those works only to the extent that
183. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
184. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *17.
185. Id.
186. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358-359 (finding that while the plaintiffs white pages
were "entirely typical," not every selection, coordination or arrangement will
pass muster).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
188. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *17.

189. Id. at *20.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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they have demonstrated creativity in selecting and arranging
preexisting material into an original collective whole."' Publishers
can narrowly revise their collective works in accordance with
certain limitations. Publishers are not permitted to place the
writers' articles into "new anthologies" or "entirely different
magazines or other collective works" aside from the collective
works in which the article first appeared.192 The publishers'
revisions must preserve the distinguishing original characteristic or
"defining element" of the original collective works.' 93 They must
ensure that the original characteristic is prevalent in the resulting
revision in order to be protected within the privilege to reproduce
and revise its copyrighted work. 4
The authors of collective works must also be aware of the
dangers in taking independently authored original works and, by
instilling an essential original element, create a derivative work
from the original.195 Derivative works are so closely related to
collective works, that professionals in the publishing industry must
recognize the caveat that careless revision of an original work may
result in the creation of a derivative work constituting copyright
infingement.'9
E. Holding
The Court held the defendants were within their legal right to
make the electronic revision under § 201(c) and the electronic
database companies were transferred this right under full authority
of the Copyright Act. The Court seemed to reason that the
publishers had a right to electronically "preserve" their works in
new ways aided with new efficiency in the interest of the public's
accessibility to a wide range of writer's articles.'97 Moreover, the
court found that the defendants' electronic reproductions served the
same basic function as newspapers and magazines, each as sources
191. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *17.
192. Id. at* 18.
193. Loundy, supra note 2, at 198.
194. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *18.
195. NIMMEP, supra note 3, § 3.02.
196. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 3.04[A].
197. by
Tasini,
1997 WL 466520,
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of information for topics selected by the publisher defendants.9
The plaintiffs were left without a substantial cause of action in
obtaining an injunction against the electronic reproduction of their
articles contained in defendants' collective works. 199
If today's result was intended, it is only because
Congress could not have fully anticipated the ways
in which modem technology would create such
lucrative markets for revisions, it is not because
Congress intended for the term revision to apply
any less broadly than the court applies it today....
Plaintiffs' real complaint lies in the fact that modem
technology has created a situation in which revision
rights are much more valuable than anticipated at
the time when the specific terms of the Copyright
Act were being negotiated. Congress is of course
free to revise that provision to achieve a more
equitable result.2"
The court opined that it did not take lightly the potential
deprivation of rights to authors resulting from this holding, but
justified this result with the only law it is given to interpret, the
Copyright Act.20'
IMPACT

I. Plaintiffs
In response to Judge Sotomayer's holding, Tasini claimed "the
fight for a fair share continues."2 2 The largest obstacle the
plaintiffs must face, in addition to an appeal, is the proliferation of
198. Id.
199. Id. at *24.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Press Release, August 13, 1997, Writers Consider Appeal, Legislative

Action in wake of Copyright Lawsuit Decision (visited August 18, 1997)
<http://www.nwu.org/nwu/tvt/tvtpr.htm>.
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"All Rights" contracts imposed by large publishers. All Rights
contracts are characterized by the plaintiffs as being "like
encroachments on other basic rights, they strip people of a core
element of who they are, whether that be a writer, a citizen, or a
working member of society."20 3 The plaintiffs suggest another
remedy, the Publication Rights Clearinghouse (PRC). °4 PRC is
the National Writers Union proposed solution to compensate
freelance writers for the infringement of their articles and
photographs." 5 The creation of the PRC is a watershed event in
the history of the NWU because it is an agency that puts money
directly into the pockets of working writers.2"6 PRC facilitates the
management of their members' works when sold to be republished
in other mediums. PRC gets writers to become members and grant
certain licensing rights to PRC, who in turn assigns those rights to
publishers for initial publication in collective works in exchange
for fees.20 7 Subsequently, the publishers are expressly permitted to
use electronic database companies and other media sources to
make money not transferable back to original creators or PRC.
Tasini urges writers to keep in mind that Judge Sotomayer's
ruling does not deal with their works that are republished on the
World Wide Web. 0 8 The writer's transfer of rights to electronic
republishes to reuse their works on web pages or in chat rooms are
not explicitly addressed in the court's discussion of § 201, § 103(b)
or § 204(d), although Tasini affects all electronic media.
I. Defendants
On its face, Tasini should provide some "welcome relief for the
publishing community. [It] points out the continued need for clear,

203. Id.
204. Welcome to the PublicationRights Clearinghouse(last modified

February 6, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/nwu/prc/prchome.htm>.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Jonathan Tasini, Writers Win Major Points,Lose on Strange
Interpretationof CopyrightLaw (last modified Augustl4,1997) <http:// www.
igc.apc.org/nwu.tvt.tvtstate.htm.>.
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written agreements in dealing with free-lancers." ' However, the
prominent, well-respected publisher, National Geographic, may be
adversely affected by the potential future appeal of the Tasini
holding. National Geographic is planning to market a series of
CD-ROMs that will eventually include every article of every issue
that the magazine has published in the last 108 years. 0 Whether
National Geographic owns the copyright to each article or
photograph intended to be included in the CD-ROM series is
unclear. It would be a reasonable assumption that at least some of
the freelance contributors retain reproduction fights and the right to
be paid for further editorial use of their works.211 National
Geographic's right to electronically reproduce its issues via CDROM is bolstered by the initial holding in Tasini, but remains
subject to an appeal or another district court's interpretation of the
rights to electronically revise under the Copyright Act.212
Similar to the Times' All Rights contracts, publishers will now
need to overcompensate for the contracting of rights, when the
earlier and easier one page and even oral contracts were
sufficient."' Popular periodicals have altered their "standard"
contracts, earmarking specific payments for these extra electronic
bites that they want to take out of the original apple." 4 These
"ultra-contracts"' or "contracts from hell" prove to be necessary to
protect all parties involved in the freelance writer's engagement
with periodical publishers."1 However, the disadvantages of the
installment of such practices of "acquiring all rights" can be felt on
both sides.2" 6 The best freelancers may go elsewhere to protect the
integrity of their articles which ultimately may result in the
compromise of the publication's intrinsic value. Alternatively,
freelancers may be muscled by large publishing companies to
surrender all ownership rights in its work for a one-time payment.
209. Ron Abramson, PublishersSigh With Relief After 'Tasini', 218 N.Y.L.J.
5, September 26, 1997, at *5.
210. Claire Safran, Whose Work Is It Anyway?, FOLIO: THE MAGAZINE FOR
MAGAZINE MANAGEMENT, 1997 WL 2006240, September 15, 1997, at *1.
211. Tasini, 1997 WL 466520, at *24.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
213. Safran, supra note 210, at *2.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Perhaps we have lost sight of the real relationship between
freelance writers and publishers.2 17 Commentaries inspired by
Tasini remind us that freelance writers are not staff employees with
guaranteed wages, benefits and for that matter secure work.218

IN. Changes in the Legislation
Copyright laws have been amended several times and are due for
another re-evaluation in Congress.219 Writers hope that in doing so,
legislators look to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 8
which states, "Congress shall have the Power.. .to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Time
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writing and Discoveries."
Note that publishers are not
2
0
mentioned.
International governmental agencies have been created to
address the copyright and trademark issues in recognition of the
inadequacies of current law such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"). 221 WIPO is the international body that
debates and formulates international standards for the use and
protection of intellectual property.222
Last year, the WIPO
Diplomatic Conference adopted two treaties concerning the need
for protecting computer programs and original databases in the
global marketplace.223 "Both treaties include provisions which
offer responses to the challenges of digital technology, particularly
on the Internet. They provide an exclusive right for authors,
performers, and producers of phonographs to authorize the making
available of their works, performances and photographs,
respectively, to the public."224 The WIPO has recently addressed
217. Id.
218. Safran, supra note 210, at *3.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 6.
221. Westfs Legal News 14591, 1997 WL 12502, January 1, 1997.
222. Id.
223. WIPO Approves New Copyright Treaty, 14 No. 1 COMPUTER LAW, at
*29 (January 1997).
224. by
Wests
Legal News,
supra note 221.
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the need to extend or create copyright protection to owners of
electronic databases. In May 1996, a bill was introduced in the
United States Congress (the "Data Intellectual Property Antipiracy
Act of 1996") that would create a new federal statute for database
copyright protection.225 The WIPO Copyright Treaty includes
provisions designed to adapt to new digital technology, particularly
the Internet.226 The treaty also suggests obligations concerning
technological measures of protection and electronic rights
management information while addressing whether or not specific
provisions are needed concerning the application of the right of
reproduction concerning some transient, temporary, incidental
reproductions.227
CONCLUSION

Tasini v. New York Times is inherently controversial due to the
dynamics of the application of traditional Copyright Law to
contemporary computer technology. Judge Sotomayer interpreted
certain definitions of the Copyright Act in manner most favorable
for the defendant publishers. The Court found publishers have the
right to make and sell electronic copies of their periodicals and
newspapers without the expressed permission of the individual
articles' authors. In the absence of explicit retention of the control
of the commercial re-use of an article, the court determined the
Copyright Act automatically transfers the authors' privilege to sell
their articles to electronic publishers to owners of the collective
work. Since Tasini, the understanding of "North American Rights
of First publication" can no longer serve as adequate protection to
individual writers when contracting with publishers, effectuating
far-reaching ramifications within the publishing industry. In
denying the plaintiffs' relief, this opinion leaves the issue to be
addressed by the legislature.228 The future contracts between
writers and publishers have already suffered from the effects Tasini
225. Id.
226. WIPO Approves New Copyright Treaty, supranote 223, at *29.
227. Id.
228. Tasini vs. The New York Times, What Does it Mean for Writers? (last
modified August 23, 1997) <http:/www.igc.apc.org/nwu/tvt/tvtwrit.htm>.
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with "All Rights" contracts and "ultra contracts," and will continue
to adapt in the event of an appeal to the court's ruling. Judge
Sotomayer acknowledged that her holding "deprives plaintiffs of
certain economic benefits associated with their creations,"
concluding that "this does not result from any misapplication of
§201(c), but from modem developments
which have changes the
229
financial landscape in publishing."

Dina Marie Pascarelli
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